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Abstract
We analyze optimal strategies for the allocation of a finite budget that can be invested in different advertising channels over
time with the objective of influencing social opinions in a network of individuals. In our analysis, we consider both exogenous
influence mechanisms, such as advertising campaigns, as well as endogenous mechanisms of social influence, such as word-of-
mouth and peer-pressure, which are modeled using diffusion dynamics. We show that for a broad family of objective functions,
the optimal influence strategy at every time uses all channels at either their maximum rate or not at all, i.e., a bang-bang strategy.
Furthermore, we prove that the number of switches between these extremes is bounded above by a term that is typically much
smaller than the number of agents. This means that the optimal influence strategy is to exert maximum effort in waves for every
channel, and then cease effort and let the effects propagate. We also show that, at the beginning of the campaign, the total
cost-adjusted reach of an exogenous advertising channel determines its relative value. In contrast, as we approach our investment
horizon (e.g., election day), the optimal strategy is to invest in channels able to target individuals instead of broad-reaching
channels. We demonstrate that the optimal influence strategies are easily computable in several practical cases, and explicitly
characterize the optimal controls for the case of linear objective functions in closed form. Finally, we see that, in the canonical
example of designing an election campaign, identifying late-deciders is a critical component in the optimal design.
I. INTRODUCTION
OPINIONS are important definers of real-world outcomes: they affect who is elected for political office [1], which policiesare successful [2], and which products are bought by customers [3]. The proliferation of online media has complicated [4],
sped up [5], and enhanced [6] opinion formation processes. The opinion formation process can be affected by interested parties
through advertising channels, which are media by which messages are distributed to a target audience. Political campaigns and
marketing departments apportion their advertising budgets between such channels (e.g., TV ads, website banner ads, billboards)
in order to maximize some ultimate goal (e.g., votes, sales) [7], though the extent of the effect of these efforts is a matter of
debate [1], [8]. The importance of this decision has increased in conjunction with the increasing resources devoted to these
efforts: In 2017, over $1 trillion was spent on marketing globally [9], while $9.8 billion was spent on advertising in the 2016
US elections alone [10]. Thus, studying the related multi-channel resource allocation problem is both timely and significant.
In particular, the mechanisms of opinion influence can be classified into two types based on its direct provenance. First,
there are endogenous influence mechanisms (e.g., word-of-mouth), in which individuals process the expressed opinions of
other individuals they meet, and consider their credibility and the level of acquaintance and trust in synthesizing a new
opinion based on the information.1 This leads to the notion of an endogenous influence weighted graph capturing endogenous
influence between individuals. On the other hand, there are exogenous influence mechanisms, in which an external influencer
seeks to shape the opinions of an individual. This mechanism is facilitated by various advertising channels2. In our opinion
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1These weights can, in general, be dynamic, even depending on the expressed opinion [11]. In this work, we consider static weights.
2Throughout this work, we use the word channel to represent both the medium (e.g., TV advertising) and the reach of the medium (e.g., people who watch
TV) – the distinction is clear in context.
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2Fig. 1. Different advertising channels have differing, possibly overlapping, reaches and come with differing costs. Furthermore, the effect of a channel may
differ across individuals. These external influences are modulated by internal conversations within the network whereby agents integrate this information with
that of their neighbors. The decision of the advertiser is to apportion resources between these channels factoring in these complexities so as to get an optimal
return on investment, which in the election example is votes cast in favor of the campaign.
formation model, each channel has a reach structure, i.e. the individuals that can be reached by that channel, that is not
necessarily related to the endogenous neighborhood. The actions of other external influencers also affect each individual’s
opinion formation process, which can in general be a random (noisy) process. The external influencer seeks to maximize a
function of the global state (the vector of individual opinions) at a specific time (e.g., election day) by allocating their budget
across several advertising channels in a given time interval (see Fig. 1). In this paper, we study the nature of the optimal budget
allocation and provide structures and algorithms for their computation.
Finding the optimal budget allocation is complicated by several factors: (i) The reach of each channel is limited, and there
are significant overlaps between the target audiences of various channels [12]; (ii) different channels have differing costs, and
attempts to influence opinions by external sources can affect individuals in different, and sometimes opposite, ways [13]; (iii)
the budget allocation decision is dynamic (depends on time) and changes with the state of the network. Furthermore, the
influencer faces several trade-offs: utilizing an advertising channel early allows the influenced individuals to spread the effect
to their neighbors (diffusion), while lessening the impact on the influenced individuals as they moderate the effects of the
external influence with the opinions of their neighbors (dilution). There is also a trade-off between utilizing cheap channels
versus utilizing expensive but effective ones. These competing forces make the a priori determination of the optimal budget
allocation hard to determine.
There are also significant technical challenges to solving this problem, since characterizing the optimal budget allocation
across channels and throughout the time interval requires characterizing the structure of an optimal constrained vector of
controls over a graph. Furthermore, the work also requires computing the optimal control of the well-studied linear consensus
dynamics [14], [15] in a novel setting, as the classical literature is concerned with reaching agreement among agents, while
our objectives may incentivize agreement in some circumstances and disagreement in others. As we show in this paper, finding
the optimal allocation in our problem requires a new synthesis of spectral graph theory and optimal control theory.
Contributions: In this work, we model the advertising influence problem as a constrained consensus control process in
an arbitrary network with overlapping influence channels and endogenous influence of agents on each other [16]. Using
Pontryagin’s maximum principle, spectral graph theory, and custom analytical arguments, we determine the structure of the
optimal budget allocation to the various influence channels along a given time horizon.
We show that for a broad family of objectives, the optimal control for each channel is bang-bang (only takes its extreme
values), with the number of switches being upper-bounded by a term which is smaller than the number of individuals. Therefore,
the search for optimal controls can be conducted on the space of vectors of a fixed size whose entries represent times of
switching between extreme values rather than on the space of functions. Furthermore, for the case of a linear objective (i.e.,
when individuals make a decision in proportion to their opinion value), we explicitly calculate the optimal budget allocation
over time, providing an open-loop algorithm that can compute the vector of optimal controls in a logarithmic number of steps.
This allocation also implicitly determines the relative importance of a particular channel to the global objective, and thus
defines an explicitly computable metric for the influence of a channel at any given time. This metric allows the influencer to
compare and contrast the effects of different channels, as well as the effect of a channel at different times. Finally, our results
3show that investing in an influence channel reaching likely voters is important as we get close to decision/election time, while
the cost-effectiveness of a channel (defined as its total reach divided by its cost) is more important at earlier times.
For the case where the objective is a sum of sigmoids, which is a relaxed version of voting between two alternatives, we
show that the optimal control can be approximated just by knowing the agents who change their minds at the terminal time
in the optimal allocation (late-deciders [17]).
In sum, our work represents a new confluence of the literature on consensus dynamics and optimal control theory, while
providing significant novel structures, computational algorithms, metrics, and insights to the optimal budget allocation for the
multi-channel advertising problem.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
As this work draws upon the literature in multiple areas, we will discuss antecedents in each area in turn:
Consensus and opinion dynamics: Linear consensus-seeking dynamics are some of the oldest models used to model the
spread of opinions and social influence, first proposed by French [18] and expounded upon by DeGroot [19]. In these models,
opinions (states) are taken to be continuous real variables, and each node uses a (weighted) average opinion of its neighbors’
opinions in each time-step to update its opinion. Abelson [20] provided a continuous-time variant of these dynamics, which
is the model we base our work upon. This work was generalized first by Taylor [21] to also incorporate individual-specific
prejudices, leading to the desirable persistence of opinion cleavage within such simple models (leading to a dynamics very
similar to ours). Other closely related continuous-time variants of these dynamics have been rigorously studied by control
theorists [14], [15], [22], [23]. Most of these results focus on asymptotic properties of these dynamics and their convergence,
and not on their finite-time behavior and the effect of influence on such behavior. While more complex models of opinion
dynamics have been proposed and studied in detail [11], [24], [25], the linear consensus dynamics remains a baseline for
comparison. Recent detailed overviews of the developments in the field of opinion dynamics make the above distinctions and
limitations clearer [26], [27]. Finally, the linear approximation of the effect of external influence on opinion dynamics also
follows a long-standing tradition [21], [24]. Our work covers finite-time budget-constrained opinion change with a specific
goal, while the focus of these papers is understanding asymptotic properties of these systems (without strategic interventions
and goals).
Control of Opinion Propagation: The case of influencing opinion dynamics is a research question of current interest. The
problem of Influence Maximization (IM) consists of finding the set of individuals that must be initially influenced in order to
maximize the final effect of endogenous spreading mechanisms [28]. Variants of this problem, under multiple models of opinion
propagation, have been the subject of much study (e.g., [29]–[32]). Among this line of work, budgeted influence maximization
with partial incentives [33] is the closest to our setting, as it relaxes the artificial binary assumptions on the success of influence
efforts. While this literature is closely related to work on epidemic control [32], its more immediate analog is work on control
of social learning. For example, Yildiz et al. [34] consider the case of stubborn agents who refuse to change their opinions in
a two-opinion voter model. They show that the mean average opinion is only a function of the structure of the network and
the placement of the stubborn nodes. They then investigate the optimal placement of these stubborn nodes. However, the focus
of all of these papers has been on static optimization, i.e., actions that are taken at a specific point in time. On the other hand,
social networks are naturally dynamic, i.e., their states are time-varying, and it is natural to assume that actions prescribed
to affect them can also be dynamic. In this paper, we analyze such optimal actions (henceforth referred to as controls) using
tools from optimal control theory.
Linear Optimal Control: In linear optimal control problems, a controller seeks to optimize the time integration of a linear
objective depending on the states and inputs of a linear dynamical system with linear bounded controls.
In the case where actions are not costly and the time horizon is not fixed, the optimal control signal has a bang-bang
structure with a finite number of switches [35]–[37]. However, these results do not apply directly in the case with costly
actions and where the goal is not to drive the system to a known state in minimum time. In contrast, our work takes a step
beyond those results and provides a context-specific method for evaluating the relative influence value on a channel within a
time horizon.
Optimal Control of Epidemic Spread and Diffusion: This work bears a similarity with the literature on the optimal control
of information spread, in that both aim to optimize a terminal function subject to some spread dynamics. Most such work uses
compartmental epidemic models (e.g., SI [38], [39]) and is thus dissimilar in dynamics to the one we consider. Furthermore, we
show that when opinions can take continuous values (instead of the finite fixed values assumed in compartmental models), the
optimal controls for influence maximization are significantly different to the strategies derived for information spread (which
typically advocate some form of maximal spreading at the start of the time interval [39], [40]). The model also allows an even
more explicit incorporation of graph structure than metapopulation models, e.g., [41], as their approximation breaks down when
the population of each patch/type is small, and therefore provides a poor model for interactions at the scale of individuals.
Adversarial Sensor Network Deception: Finally, the problem discussed in this paper has a direct analog in the optimal
deception of a sensor network by an adversary, as discussed in [42]. In this setting, a state-estimation sensor network [43]
can be misdirected through local noise injection at a fixed number of points, that will affect a subset of nodes in the vicinity.
4The optimal locations and patterns for the noise to affect the conclusion of the network will depend also on the dynamic
information fusion model of the sensor network and its relationship with the reach of each of the noise injection points. This
problem, too, will require the same type of exogenous influence and endogenous processing model as the opinion influence
problem, as well as having the same objective structure. Thus, any structural results obtained will have direct implications for
the adversary’s optimal deception policy. The modeling approach employed in our work is, to the best of our knowledge, novel
for this setting.
In summary, our work integrates elements of the rich literature in linear consensus protocols, spectral graph theory, and
optimal control, and applies the synthesis to the problem of resource allocation in advertising, achieving strong structural
guarantees and applied insights.
III. SYSTEM MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we present our notation (§III-A) and outline our system model (§III-B) and its dynamics (§III-C). Then
we outline the bounds on the actions of the influencer (§III-D) and describe their objective (§III-E). We finish the section by
presenting a technical assumption (§III-F) and by stating the overall problem (§III-G).
A. Notation
n = number of agents
m = number of channels
xi(t) = opinion of agent i at time t, i = 1, . . . , n
uk(t) = utilization of channel k at time t, k = 1, . . . ,m
umaxk (t) = maximum utilization of channel k at time t
aij = magnitude of effect agent j’s opinion on the opinion of agent i
Ni = neighbors of agent i in communication graph G
Hk = set of agents within the reach of channel k
bik = relative magnitude of the effect of utilization of channel k on agent i
ei(t) = sum effect of other influences on agent i at time t
T = terminal time
ck(·) = cost of influence on channel k
r = total resources of influencer over the time period
U = set of feasible influence allocations
Ji(·) = value of opinion of agent i at time T to influencer
J(·) = value of opinion profile at time T to influencer
We use bold lower case letters to denote vectors and bold upper case letters to denote matrices, [n] to represent {1, 2, . . . , n},
and 〈a, b〉 to represent aTb. For a matrix W, we denote the k-th column of W as W(:, k), and the k-th row of the same as
W(k, :). Furthermore, we use wij to denote the (i, j)-th element of the matrix W.
B. System Model
We consider a social system with n agents. The state/opinion of agent i ∈ [n] at time t is denoted by xi(t) ∈ R. Each agent
communicates with other agents based on an edge-weighted, undirected, and connected communication graph G = (V,E,A).
The (non-negative) weight on an edge between agents i, j ∈ [n], which determines the relative influence agent j has on agent
i’s state update, is represented by aij , and the matrix of such weights is represented by A. An agent j is said to be a neighbor
of agent i (and vice versa) if aij = aji > 0 (see Fig. 2).3 The assumption of symmetric interaction weights, that a difference
of opinion can have the same magnitude effect on both sides of an interaction, is common in the Influence Maximization
literature, most commonly being present in the Independent Cascade (IC) model [28], [44], [45].
Remark 1. However, weighted directed communication graphs can also be considered in our framework, in which case some
of our results apply to cases where the weighted Laplacian of the graph has real eigenvalues.4 In particular, this includes the
set of quasi-strongly connected weighted Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs).
3While negative weight updates are conceivable, they will not be considered in this paper.
4Lemma 1 and Theorem 1.1 carry over, as does a modification of the water-filling procedure in §IV-C. For specifics, see §VI.
5Fig. 2. Each agent takes into account the opinions of its neighbors in updating its own opinion. The weight given by node i to the opinion of its neighbor j
is a measure of how much i trusts j’s appraisal. If agents i and j are not neighbors, aij = 0 by default. In our model, aij = aji, i.e., trust is a symmetric
relation, though our results apply even if that is not the case (see conditions in Remark 1).
At each time t, each agent updates its state based on a weighted average of the difference of its current state from those of
its neighbors, as well as on an external influence that will be described below, and a known drift signal (which may be due
to the influence of other competing influencers), which we denote by ei(t) for i ∈ [n].
An influencer aims to shape the opinion profile (i.e., the opinion vector of all agents) at a fixed terminal time T according
to an objective function through the judicious use of particular influence channels. Each channel of influence (e.g., advertising
medium) is limited in its reach, as it only affects a specific subset of agents (denoted Hk for channel k). The structure of
these m influence channels is pre-specified, with the assumption that influencing a channel only directly affects the members
within that channel. The influence exerted by the influencer on channel i ∈ [m] at time t is denoted by the scalar ui(t).
In this model, the effect of influence on a channel can differ across agents within the channel, potentially even having
opposite effects. These effects are captured by the influence gain, denoted by bik, which determines the linear relative gain of
influence of channel k ∈ [m] on agent i within that channel. For example, if billboard advertising (say, channel k) has a more
positive effect on the opinion of individual i than advertising on the radio (say, channel l), we will have bik > bil.5 If agent i
is not within channel k, we define bik to be zero. Without loss of generality, we assume ui ≥ 0 for i ∈ [m], and encode the
possible negative effects of channel i on agent k within its reach through the sign of bik. Stacking these values into a matrix
Bn∗m captures the structure of the channels.
C. Dynamics
To understand the dynamics, we provide the following discrete-time intuition: an agent i ∈ [n] constructs its change in state
in the time interval (t, t+ ∆) based on the weighted difference between its own state and that of its neighbors, as well as the
external influence exerted on it in that time period and the drift signal:
xi(t+∆) = xi(t) + ∆
( ∑
j∈Ni
aij(xj(t)− xi(t)) +
∑
k:i∈Hk
bikuk(t) + ei(t)
)
.
This simply states that agents attempt to align their state/opinion with that of their neighbors, and the influencer’s effort may
act as a hindrance to that process. Mathematically, it can be thought of as a gradient descent algorithm implemented by agents
seeking to minimize disagreement (measured by a Laplacian potential) [22]. The above can be re-written to represent the
classic discrete-time consensus model [19] with influence:6
xi(t+ ∆) =(1−∆
∑
j∈Ni
aij)xi(t) + ∆
∑
j∈Ni
aijxj(t) + ∆
( ∑
k:i∈Hk
bikuk(t) + ei(t)
)
.
Note also that, from this formulation, it is evident that the influencer’s effect on the state of any individual is dissipative, as
their prior state is discounted by a factor of (1−∆∑j∈Ni aij) < 1 at every time-step.7
Subtracting xi(t) from both sides, dividing by ∆ and taking the limit as ∆ goes to zero, we arrive at the following continuous
time agent-level dynamics:8
x˙i(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
aij(xj(t)− xi(t)) +
∑
k:i∈Hk
bikuk(t) + ei(t).
5Note that the magnitude of bik can be determined by comparing the size of the effect of channel k on individual i’s opinion with that of one of i’s
neighbors having the same amount of difference in opinion with i. At scale, these orderings and values can possibly be inferred from demographic information.
6The results derived in this paper would also apply to the Friedkin and Johnsen model of opinion updates [24] given uniform susceptibility to change across
agents.
7This can be seen by looking at the explicit effect after two time-steps (i.e., time t + 2∆), where the effect of direct influence exerted at time
t, u(t), is multiplied by (1 − ∆∑j∈Ni aij): xi(t + 2∆) = . . . + ∆∑k:i∈Hk bikuk(t + ∆) + (1−∆∑j∈Niaij)∆∑k:i∈Hk bikuk(t) +
∆2
(∑
j∈Ni
∑
m:j∈Hm aijbjmum(t)
)
+ . . .
8While discrete-time dynamics are more commonly used for the modeling of opinions, discretization is typically a simplifying assumption for analytic
purposes. In this paper, we work with the continuous-time dynamics directly, which allows the use of mathematical tools new to the domain. However, all
derived structures and insights for the continuous case can be discretized and applied to the discrete-time case as well.
6We let L be the weighted Laplacian matrix, where for all i, j ∈ [n] such that i 6= j, lij = −aij , and lii =
∑
j∈Ni aij for all
i ∈ [n]. Stacking the n equations, we arrive at the following system-level dynamics:
x˙(t) = −Lx(t) + Bu(t) + e(t) (1)
We assume that the states/opinions at time 0 are known (x(0) = x0), however we will see that the value of the states at time
0 has no direct bearing on our structural results.
D. Admissible Control Strategies
The total expenditure on all channels is bounded by r > 0, which is the budget available to the influencer. This is captured
through the following budget constraint:∫ T
0
m∑
k=1
ck(uk(t)) dt ≤ r (budget constraint), (2)
where ck(·) represents the time-independent cost-function which maps the utilization of channel k to its associated cost to the
influencer.
Assumption 1. We assume that for all k ∈ [m], ck(·) is increasing, differentiable and concave as a function of channel k’s
utilization. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we assume that ck(0) = 0 for all k ∈ [m].
This assumption models the diminishing cost of additional utilization of a channel once it is already in use. The above
assumption allows the case where ck is linear (that is ck(x) = vkx). We assume that for all channels k ∈ [m], the influence
that can be exerted on channel k at any time t is bounded above by a time-varying value umaxk (t).
9 This can capture both
physical limits on the influence (i.e., availability of media) and limits on the susceptibility of agents to the influence. We
impose the modest assumption that umaxk (t) is differentiable. Hence, we have that:
∀k ∈ [m], 0 ≤ uk(t) ≤ umaxk (t) (influence constraint) (3)
We will restrict our analysis to control signals u that are piecewise continuous with only a finite number of discontinuities10.
We shall use U to denote the set of such controls that fulfill (3):
U = {u : 0 ≤ uk(t) ≤ umaxk (t), k ∈ [m], t ∈ [0, T ]}.
In our model, employing channel k ∈ [m] at effort level u at time t ∈ [0, T ] incurs a cost of ck(u), where for all k ∈ [m],
ck : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞). Note that we assume that for all k ∈ [m], the cost function ck(·) is time-invariant.
E. Objective
The objective of the influencer is a function of the opinion profile at a fixed time T . The nature of the function will depend
on the information aggregation method employed by the set of individuals. We consider the most general case, where any
increase in the opinion of any particular individual at time T (keeping all other opinions the same) is not detrimental to the
influencer. This is obviously the case in both political and marketing campaigns. While our reasoning applies to a general
family of objective functions, we will give special consideration to functions that model voting in an election between two
options (relevant in the political campaign setting) and weighted averaging (relevant in estimating total returns from marketing
efforts and in the sensor network setting).
Assumption 2. The objective, J(x(T )), is an increasing, differentiable function of the n components of the vector of terminal
opinions x(T ).
In particular, we will elaborate on the application of our results to a particular family of objective functions that are separable
in the elements of the vector of opinions, as follows:
J(x(T )) =
n∑
i=1
Ji(xi(T )). (4)
Two specific types of separable functions are of particular interest:
1) Linear functions:
Ji(xi(T )) = pixi(T ), pi > 0, (5)
which model the simplest case, where the utility the influencer gains from an individual has a linear relationship with its
state at time T . In the marketing example, this can model the amount of sales as a simple function of an individual’s opinion
9This rules out impulse controls.
10This means, in particular, that the integral in (2) is well-defined.
7of a product. This is also a useful approximation in the adversarial sensor network deception case where the utility for the
influencer is a simple function of a sensor’s report level. The mapping of the election example to this utility is not direct: this
can model the case where each agent votes with probability pi, and if it does, chooses among two options with a probability
that is linearly related to their opinion (i.e., they flip an appropriately weighted coin). However, finding the correct total weight
of the coin to be considered depends on the assumptions made by the modeler, and multiple normalizations may be defensible.
This ambiguity leads to the definition of a second type of utility for the specific case of the election example.
2) Sigmoid functions: Assume each individual i ∈ [n] has to vote for one of two options (e.g., candidates, products, policies),
encoded by 0 and 1, at time T . Assume that the influencer backs option 1 (without loss of generality). Each individual is
assumed to vote with probability pi > 0, and to choose who to vote for among two options based on whether their state at
time T is above or below an agent-specific threshold θi (which models the various biases for and against an option). Thus,
the utility gained from each individual can be modeled using a Heaviside function with a jump at θi, which is agent i’s vote.
However, this utility is discontinuous at xi(T ) = θi, which complicates analysis. The sigmoid function:
Ji(xi(T )) =
pi
1 + e−αi(xi(T )−θi)
, (6)
is a smooth approximation to the Heaviside utility, with the closeness of the approximation being determined by the choice of
the parameter αi — the greater αi is, the faster the transition. In the extreme of taking αi to infinity, this function will indeed
converge to the aforementioned Heaviside function.
F. Technical Assumption
We now add a technical assumption that will be needed in our arguments:
Assumption 3. There exists a j ∈ [n] such that ∂J(z)
∂zj(T )
> 0 for all z ∈ Rn.
Note that this is equivalent to saying there exists at least one individual such that the influencer always values a marginal
increase in its state. That is, holding all opinions the same, any increase in that agent’s opinion will be translated to a strict
increase in their likelihood of voting for the choice backed by the influencer.11 The purpose of this assumption is to rule out
a pathological case where the necessity conditions for the optimality of an allocation become so general that they apply to all
controls and are thus uninformative.
G. Problem Statement
We aim to characterize the control inputs u(t) that maximize J(x(T )) under the dynamics outlined in (1) and constraints
(3) and (2). Mathematically, we state our problem as:
max
u∈U
J(x(T ))
s.t. x˙(t) = −Lx(t) + Bu(t) + e(t), x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn∫ T
0
m∑
k=1
ck(uk(t)) dt ≤ r,
e(t) given.
Note that the above problem is non-convex in general owing to the potentially non-convex objective function, as well as the
potentially non-convex budget constraint (when any of the ci(·)’s are strictly concave). In this paper, we solve it using tools
from optimal control theory. It should be observed that the number of competing influence channels, m, and therefore the
number of optimization variables, can potentially be large. These factors complicate naive approaches to solving the problem.
We reformulate the problem with auxiliary variables to aid the analysis. We define the auxiliary functions γ and q such that,
γ(0) = 0, γ˙(t) = −
m∑
k=1
ck(uk(t)), (7)
q(0) = 0, q˙(t) = 1. (8)
11This rules out J(·) functions with stationary points, i.e., those for which ∇zJ(z) = 0 for some z ∈ Rn. For example, this rules out an objective which
is a sum of Heaviside functions.
8As can be seen, γ(t) is the accumulated cost of the influence up to time t, and q is a proxy for time12. Thus, the budget
constraint becomes γ(T ) ≥ −r, and the integral constraint has been transformed to a terminal time one. So we can rewrite
the optimization as:
max
u∈U
J(x(T )) (9)
s.t. x˙(t) = −Lx(t) + Bu(t) + e(q), x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn,
γ˙(t) = −
m∑
k=1
ck(uk(t)), q˙(t) = 1, γ(T ) ≥ −r,
e(t) given, γ(0) = 0, q(0) = 0.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we outline the analytical structures of the optimal controls. To show the nature of the results, we first explain
some necessary priors in §IV-A. Then, we prove the existence of optimal controls (under some conditions) and identify their
structure using our main theorem in §IV-B (with proofs in §Appendices A and B, respectively). A refinement is presented for
the case of the linear objective §IV-C that allows the direct computation of the control input u and shows that the optimal
control is unique, while providing insights into the logic of the allocation decision. Finally, the sigmoid approximation to
voting is covered in §IV-D and an approximation to the optimal control is presented.
A. Preliminaries
For an undirected, connected graph G, the weighted Laplacian matrix L is real, symmetric, and positive semi-definite;
hence it has real, non-negative eigenvalues [46, page 13]. Thus, L has an eigen-decomposition L = QΞQT , where Q is a
real orthogonal matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of L, and Ξ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of L) [47, p.
393, Theorem 8.1.1].13 The smallest eigenvalue of L is always zero, its multiplicity is 1, and its associated eigenvector is
1√
n
1n, where 1n = (1, . . . , 1)T (as G is connected) [46, page 13]. We will order the eigenvalues of Ξ smallest to largest
(ξ1 = 0 < ξ2 ≤ . . . ≤ ξn) and, therefore, column i ∈ [m] of Q, Q(:, i) will be the i-th eigenvector of L. This means that
Q(:, 1) = 1√
n
1n.
We now state a lemma that shows that an optimal control u for the main problem exists. We then state our main result
(Theorem 1) and present a subcase where the bound can be significantly strengthened and the optimal control can be calculated
in open-loop (Theorem 1). We provide proofs of these results in §Appendix A and §Appendix B, respectively.
B. Existence of Optimal Solutions and Structural Results for the Optimal Control
We prove (in §Appendix A) that optimal controls for (9), exist when ci(·)’s are linear.
Lemma 1. Optimal controls for problem (9) exist for linear costs, i.e., ci(ui) = viui for all i ∈ [m].
We are now ready to state our main theorem. We will provide results for a large natural class of channels that we shall call
disciplined. We first formally define the set of disciplined channels I before stating the theorem:
Definition 1. The set of disciplined channels, I ⊆ [m], is such that for all i ∈ I, one of the two following conditions holds:
• ci(·) is strictly concave, 〈B(:, i),1n〉 6= 0, and umaxi (t) = umaxi for all t.
• ci(·) is linear and the system (L,LB(:, i)) is controllable [48, p. 144] (with umaxi (t) being any differentiable function).
Theorem 1. For all i ∈ I:
1) Optimal controls are bang-bang, taking on their maximum or minimum values at all times t (i.e., u∗i (t) ∈ {umaxi , 0}).
2) The number of switches between these values is bounded above:
a) In the general case, by one less than the number of non-zero elements in {〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉}nj=1.
b) For J(x(T )) = 〈p,x(T )〉, by the number of sign variations in {∑jk=1 sk}nj=1, where sj := 〈Q(:, j),p〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉.
An example of an optimal control with these characteristics is provided in Fig. 3. The proof of this theorem is presented in
§Appendix B.
This theorem means that the optimal strategy uses each channel in waves (see Fig. 3), stopping between them to let influence
propagate. From a computational stand-point, this result simplifies the space of possible optimal controls for each channel,
12The problem, as originally stated, is non-autonomous, i.e., the dynamics depend explicitly on the independent variable through the function e(t). It can
be simplified to the autonomous case, which is more suitable for computation, by removing explicit time-dependence in the dynamics through the introduction
of the dummy variable q that is always equal to time [37, page 167].
13However, the reasoning below applies to any L that has real eigenvalues for the case of linear costs ci(·) and a quasi-strongly connected communication
digraph. For details, see §VI.
9since the optimal control is characterized by the bounded number of switching times for each channel. The actual number of
switches of each optimal control can be significantly less than the fixed upper-bound of n− 1 (which can in general be very
high), as we will see in §V.
Remark 2. The conditions in Definition 1 rule out pathological cases where the necessary conditions for optimality derived
from the Maximum Principle [37, page 182] cannot directly determine the optimal value of the control (i.e., singular arcs [36,
page 113] exist).
Remark 3. The set of disciplined channels may be a proper subset of the set of channels (I ⊂ [m]), in which case the derived
structure only applies to disciplined channels. This means that even if ck(·) is non-concave or the conditions around Bk in
Definition 1 do not hold for some k, Theorem 1 will remain valid for disciplined channels. Note that optimal controls for
undisciplined channels may also abide by the bang-bang structures stated in Theorem 1.
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
0
ui
max
0 τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 T
time (t)
u
i∗ (t
)
Fig. 3. For a ci(·) and B(:, i) fulfilling the conditions of Theorem 1, the optimal control ui(t) will be bang-bang, only taking its minimum or maximum
values and switching between them a bounded number of times. Thus, the function can be fully described by the set of switching times {τi}i, making them
easier to compute, store, and implement.
C. Water-filling: Optimal Budget Allocation for Separable Linear Objectives
In this section, for separable linear objectives, we will derive a detailed cost-effectiveness metric for channel i’s utilization
that depends on the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the Laplacian (L), the channel influence gain vector (B(:, i)), and the
weights of the linear objective (p). The variation of this metric across time will result in hills and valleys that represent the
variations in the effectiveness of the channel across time. Choosing a water-line for this topography (see Fig. 4), we will show,
leads to the description of a candidate control which takes its maximum values when a hill is above water, and will be set to
zero when a valley is under water. This waterline is varied using the bisection/binary search method so that the cost of the
total area above water matches the budget constraint (2). We will further show how this approach generalizes for more varied
objective functions.
From the proof of Theorem 1 in §Appendix B, we can define:
hi(t) = 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 =
N∑
j=1
〈Q(:, j),p〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉e−ξj(T−t), (10)
where Q(:, j) is the j−th eigenvector of the Laplacian matrix L with associated eigenvalue ξj , and p is the vector of weights
of the linear objective, i.e., J(x(T )) = 〈p,x(T )〉, such that the necessary condition for optimal controls in the concave ci(·)
case becomes 14:
u∗i (t) =

umaxi , if hi(t) > β
∗(T )
ci(u
max
i )
umaxi
,
0, if hi(t) < β∗(T )
ci(u
max
i )
umaxi
,
?, if hi(t) = β∗(T )
ci(u
max
i )
umaxi
,
(11)
14The question mark denoting the fact that PMP does not uniquely determine the optimal u∗i at times t when ϕi(t, ui) does not change with ui.
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and for the linear ci(·):
u∗i (t) =

umaxi (t), if hi(t) > β
∗(T )vi,
0, if hi(t) < β∗(T )vi,
?, if hi(t) = β∗(T )vi,
(12)
for some optimal a priori unknown parameter β∗(T ). All other terms in (11) and (12) are explicitly computable without
solving the optimal control problem. Thus, determining β∗(T ) will determine u(t) for all t except for a finite, explicitly
bounded number of points (notice that the existence of singular controls was ruled out in the proof of Theorem 1). However,
as we shall see in (26) of the appendix, β∗(T ) > 0 if and only if
∫ T
0
∑m
k=1 ck(uk(t)) dt = r This last equation is the budget
constraint.
Define the equivalent of (11) and (12) as functions of a variable βˆ(T ), an estimate for β∗(T ):
ui(t, βˆ(T )) =

umaxi , if hi(t) > βˆ(T )
ci(u
max
i )
umaxi
,
0, if hi(t) < βˆ(T )
ci(u
max
i )
umaxi
,
?, if hi(t) = βˆ(T )
ci(u
max
i )
umaxi
.
(13)
and for the linear ci(·):
ui(t, βˆ(T )) =

umaxi (t), if hi(t) > βˆ(T )vi,
0, if hi(t) < βˆ(T )vi,
?, if hi(t) = βˆ(T )vi.
(14)
One can see that in both cases, if βˆ1(T ) > βˆ2(T ) ≥ 0, ui(t, βˆ2(T )) ≥ ui(t, βˆ1(T )) for all i and all t. This, along with
Assumption (1), leads to ci
(
ui(t, βˆ2(T ))
) ≥ ci(ui(t, βˆ1(T ))) for all i and all t, culminating in:
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
ci
(
ui(t,βˆ2(T ))
)
dt ≥
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
ci
(
ui(t, βˆ1(T ))
)
dt. (15)
As a corollary, (15) holds with equality if and only if u(t, βˆ2(T )) = u(t, βˆ1(T )) for all t (excluding any switching points).
Thus, if ∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
ci
(
ui(t, βˆ(T ))
)
dt = r, (16)
then u(t, βˆ(T )) = u∗(t) also for all t. Therefore, we have the following result:
Proposition 1. For the case of separable, linear objective functions, i.e, J(x(T )) = 〈p,x(T )〉, the unique optimal control can
be explicitly calculated using a number of evaluations of (16) that is logarithmic in the range of considered βˆ(T )’s.15
Using the process outlined above, we can use a simple bisection algorithm to find β∗(T ) and to solve the optimal control
problem using a single-shooting approach. βˆ(T ) is adjusted so as to find the root of
∫ T
0
∑m
i=1 ci
(
ui(t, βˆ(T ))
)
dt = r. This
significantly decreases the complexity of calculating the optimal control, since instead of evaluating and comparing potential
optimal solutions that fulfill the necessary conditions in Theorem 1, one can simply evaluate
∫ T
0
∑m
i=1 ci
(
ui(t, βˆ(T ))
)
dt using
(13) and (14) over a number of iterations that is logarithmic in the range of βˆ(T ) under consideration to explicitly characterize
the unique optimal control.
The procedure outlined above is also instructive in understanding the relative importance of different channels at different
times graphically. In particular, we will be interested in comparing umaxi hi(t)/ci(u
max
i ) for concave c(·) and hi(t)/vi for
linear c(·) with βˆ(T ) (as in (13) and (14)). One can think of the terms containing hi(t) as a topographic relief map, signifying
hills and valleys. βˆ(T ) represents a water-line, below which the valleys are flooded. The budget expenditure in this case is
a monotone function of the area above water (see Fig. 4). Therefore, the algorithm outlined is equivalent to adjusting the
water-line so that the budget expenditure (evaluated as a function of the land above water) matches the budget constraint.
Furthermore, the water-filling procedure shows the relative importance of channels over time with respect to external
influence. As the optimal water-level is a monotone decreasing function of the budget available, one can see that the peaks in
umaxi hi(t)/ci(u
max
i ) and hi(t)/vi signify the time intervals and channels that would be prioritized when the budget is tight,
15This proposition does not apply for the general J(x(T )), as the equivalent definition of hi(t) in (15) would have to replace p with [∂J(x)/∂x]x=x∗(T ),
which can only be evaluated with knowledge of the optimal terminal opinion vector x∗(T ).
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Fig. 4. We demonstrate a case with two hi(t)/vi functions for the case of linear ci(·). Areas above the water-line (βˆ(T )) translate to ui(t, βˆ(T )) = umaxi (t),
while those below translate to ui(t, βˆ(T )) = 0. The amount of budget spent for this βˆ(T ) can thus be calculated from the resulting ui(t, βˆ(T )), and so
βˆ(T ) can be adjusted to find β∗(T ).
while if the budget is increased, more and more channels will be utilized at an increasing set of intervals. Therefore, we
can consider the explicitly computable result of umaxi hi(t)/ci(u
max
i ) (for the linear cost case, hi(t)/vi) to be a direct metric/
total order for the effect of advertising on channel i at time t on the outcome of the election, which we shall henceforth call
cost-effectiveness of a channel.
One can extract some more insight from the structure of this metric to compare the relative importance of channels by
considering (10) at extreme values of t:
Remark 4. If t T (i.e., early on in the time horizon) and T  1ξ2 , the deciding factor in comparing the cost-effectiveness
of channels is their total reach (e.g.,
∑n
j=1 bji for channel i) per unit cost; for example, for the linear c(·) case:
hi(t)
vi
≈
 1
n
n∑
j=1
pj
(∑nj=1 bji
vi
)
, (17)
as 1n
∑n
j=1 pj is the same for all channels.
12
Proof. From §IV-A, we know that ξ1 = 0 < ξ2 ≤ . . . ≤ ξn, so when t T and T  1ξ2 , then e−ξj(T−t) ≈ 0 for j ≥ 2 and
e−ξ1(T−t) = e0 = 1. Replacing these values, and Q(:, 1) = 1√
n
1n, in (10) completes the argument.
Remark 5. However, if 1− tT  1ξn.T (i.e., late on in the time horizon), targeting (e.g., how well a channel is aligned with
the a priori likelihood of people to vote) is more important than total reach; for example, for the linear c(·) case:
hi(t)
vi
≈ 〈p,B(:, i)〉
vi
, (18)
Proof. When 1− tT  1ξn.T , then e−ξj(T−t) ≈ 1 for all j ∈ [n]. Replacing these values in (10) results in:
hi(t) =
N∑
j=1
〈Q(:, j),p〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉 = 〈p,B(:, i)〉,
due to the orthonormality of the eigenvectors in Q and the definition of an inner product.
This is instructive, as it shows that at the start of a campaign, cheap broadcast methods (that maximize total reach per unit
cost) would be preferable to costly (premature) targeting of likely voters, while as election day approaches, the alignment of
a channel with the likelihood of voting among its targets gradually increases in importance.
D. Separable Sigmoid Objective
In this case, as shown in §Appendix B, the equivalent hi(t) expression (10) will feature a term λ∗(T ), instead of p,
that depends strongly on |x∗i (T ) − θi|, how far agent i is from changing their mind (6), for all i. The further away x∗i (T )
is from θi (i.e., the farther they are from changing their mind, or alternatively the more convinced they are), the smaller
the relevant λ∗i (T ). For a given   1, define the set of late-deciders [17] under the optimal advertising action u∗ to be
L := {j : |x∗j (T )− θj | < }. When L 6= ∅ (i.e., there are late deciders), we can use the water-filling machinery in §IV-C with
the changes outlined below to approximate the cost-effectiveness of channels and to calculate the optimal allocation using the
much faster method described therein.
We define λ¯ such that:
λ¯j =
{
0 for j /∈ L,
αjpj
2 for j ∈ L.
Then, the approximate cost-effectiveness metric of channel i with linear c(·) becomes:
hi(t)
vi
=
〈
Q(:, j), λ¯
〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉e−ξj(T−t)
vi
.
This confirms the practical intuition that identifying the people who will decide late early in the campaign can delineate the
whole trajectory of the campaign.
V. SIMULATION STUDIES
In this section, we first study a simple example to show that even in small networks, the optimal budget allocation across
channels can have complicated, sometimes counter-intuitive, structures. Furthermore, we show that in many cases, the bound
derived from Theorem 1 grows much slower than the number of agents, n. Then, we study the performance of our algorithm on
a real network derived from political discussions between MIT students prior to the 2008 US general election, and compare it
to policies that use more simple centrality metrics that do not consider the temporal degrees of freedom of advertising policies.
We first examine a network of 7 agents with linear objectives, with p = (3%, 2%, 10%, 100%, 6%, 7%, 1%). Note that under
these conditions, agent 4 is the only reliable voter, with all other agents having small probabilities of voting. The connections
within the network are represented in Fig. 5; the off-diagonal elements of the Laplacian L are such that lij = 1 if there is
an edge in the figure between nodes i and j and zero otherwise. Assume two equal (linear) cost channels are available to the
advertiser: Channel 1, B(:, 1) = (1,−1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0)T has a positive impact on agents 1, 3, and 5, but a negative impact on
agent 2. It has no effect on the likely voter, agent 4. In contrast, channel 2, B(:, 2) = (−1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0)T , has a positive effect
on the likely voter, but it has more limited effects on the rest of the agents. We solve the optimal buget allocation problem in
Fig. 6 using the waterfilling methodology of §IV-C. As noted in Remarks 4 and 5, at times t T = 10, the cost-effectiveness
of the two equal cost channels is measured by (17) which is larger for channel 1, even though it does not do a good job
of targeting the likely voter. However, for t close to T , we can see that the cost-effectiveness ranking depends on the match
between the reach of the channel and the likelihood of agents to vote (18), and therefore the cost-effectiveness of channel 2
is higher. This optimal control is bang-bang with bounded numbers of transitions, as proven in Theorem 1.
One important question, especially from a computational point of view, is how tight the upper-bounds on the number of
switches are. The most general bound (Theorem 1.2.a) grows with the number of agents in the system, potentially leading to a
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1 2
Fig. 5. A network of n = 7 agents with m = 2 influence channels. The lines in solid black represent the underlying communciation network L. The blue
and red boxes delineate the two channels that are available for influence in terms of agents affected (but not intensity).
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Fig. 6. (A) We plot the cost-effectiveness of the two channels over a time horizon of T = 10 days when they have equal cost (ci(ui) = viui for i = 1, 2
with v1 = v2 = 1). We then derive the water-level βˆ for r = 11 (in green). (B) The optimal water-level determines the optimal utilization rate of the two
channels at different times. As can be seen, the channel with the most reach (channel 1) is prioritized at small t, and the one that is most aligned with the
likelihood to vote (channel 2) is prioritized late as the election draws near.
large computational burden. On the other hand, knowing λ∗(T ) will allow us to use tighter bounds, like that in Theorem 1.2.b.
We simulated 1000 random connected Erdos-Renyi graphs with uniformly random linear objective functions for the case of
B(:, 1) = (1,01×(n−1))T , and plotted the mean, variance, and maximum value of the bound in Theorem 1.2.b as the number
of agents was varied. As can be seen in Fig. 7, this latter bound is much smaller (around 10 for 200 agents), and its growth
with respect to the number of agents is very slow. This is significant since, from an applied perspective, the advertiser can
enumerate and evaluate a much smaller set of candidate optimal solutions, and yet can be reasonably sure that the best such
policy is globally optimal.
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Fig. 7. We plot the upper-bounds on the number of switches of the optimal resource allocation derived from Theorem 1 for 1000 random Erdos-Renyi graphs
for a channel that only affects the first agent as the size of the network is varied. The dashed bound is from Theorem 1.2.a, and can be seen to grow with the
number of agents. For a linear objective (Theorem 1.2.b), the grey line (with the related standard deviation band) shows the mean bound on the number of
switches, while the dashed red line shows the empirical maximum of the bound over 1000 runs. We can see that both these values are significantly smaller
than the bound from Theorem 1.2.a and increase at a much slower rate with the size of the network.
We now study the performance of our algorithm on a test scenario derived from the MIT Social Evolution data-set [49].
In this data-set, among other data, the political opinions and communication patterns of 84 MIT students are recorded in
the period prior to, and following, the 2008 US presidential election. Furthermore, the living sector and year of the students
was recorded. We consider the problem of deciding how the campaign of Barack Obama should have invested its resources
to disseminate campaign literature in order to guarantee the best electoral outcome. While this is admittedly a stylized and
somewhat simplistic, it adequately demonstrates how the model could be specified and identified.
In particular, we focus on a social network derived from the reported political discussions between students conducted on
2008-09-09 and 2008-10-19, the only two surveys conducted before the November 4th election. We consider “discussion” to be
an undirected communication between individuals, and thus we aggregate communications that are flagged by both participants.
However, we sum distinct communications between two individuals to denote a stronger bond. This process is used to generate
the Laplacian communication matrix L, including by normalizing discussions by time-frame T = 66 days. The discussion
graph is plotted in Fig. 8.
We then calculate the channel matrix B for channels that represent the 8 dorm floors and 5 seniority levels (freshman,
sophomore, junior, senior, graduate), leading to a total m of 13. The channels mapping to dorm floors capture possible
advertising on bulletin boards, for example, while the 5 seniority-based channels could represent e-mail lists targeting specific
graduating years. The weight of the effect of each channel is derived from the self-reported liberal or conservative initial bias
of the individuals, as the effect of advertising depends on its alignment with the values of the target [50]. In this example,
we consider the propagation of campaign literature targeted at liberals, and thus off-putting to conservatives. This can model
any of the wedge issues of the campaign (e.g., the Iraq war [51]). Thus, advertising can have a negative effect on outcomes
for the campaign, making some individuals less likely to vote for the candidate. Thus, we assign a non-zero value to bik if i
is in the k-th dorm floor/seniority group, with the sign being determined by individual i’s self-described “liberal” (from the
perspective of the Obama campaign, positive) or “conservative” (respectively, negative) affiliation, and the magnitude being
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Fig. 8. In this figure, political discussions between students are mapped as a graph, with the weight of links being derived from the frequency of discussions.
In the left-hand graph, nodes are colored according to the seniority of the students, while in the right-hand graph, they are colored in according to their
residence, which are the two determinants of advertising channels.
determined by their self-described strength of identification with that affiliation 16
Furthermore, and again for simplicity, we assume that all the channels have a similar linear cost, v = 1, and have similar
small effects on the voting intentions of participants umax = 0.01. The channels are also shown in Figure 8.
We consider a linear objective for the campaign. While the more complex sigmoid objective functions are a better model for
decision-making, we consider the simpler linear case for tractability. We map the self-reported likelihood of voting of participants
in September ’08 to a [0, 1] scale, taking 5 equally spaced values, and constituting the vector p. While self-reported turnout
has been shown to be an unreliable predictor of voting behavior [52], we operate under the reasonable assumption that more
reliable information is not available to the political campaign. These likelihoods of voting can be seen in Fig. 8.
Finally, we instantiate the opinions of individuals x(0) (representing their voting intentions, as viewed by the Obama
campaign) with the self-reported voting intention of individuals in September ’08, which takes 8 values, mapped to values
between [−1, 1]. Again, for simplicity, we pool third-party voters with undecided voters. A more realistic scenario with vectors
of opinions would be able to more accurately capture the diversity in opinions, but would not be as instructive as the current
example for the performance of our policy and the resulting centralities. These initial preferences can be seen in Fig. 8.
In Fig. 9, we show the water-fillling procedure and the resulting optimal utilization of the channels for this problem for
a budget of r = 52. We observe that the optimal budget allocation only uses three of the dorm floor channels, with time-
variations in the use of channels f290.2 and f290.4. This is somewhat counter-intuitive given the significantly higher reach
of the seniority-based channels, which are unused by the optimal allocation, while dorm floor f290.1, which only includes
one solitary individual, is used throughout the time period at the maximum possible rate. However, as the cost of utilizing a
channel is taken to be proportional to its reach, f290.1 is utilized because it is very effective relative to its cost.
To benchmark our results, we compared the results of the optimal budget allocation policy on electoral outcomes to policies
based on different types of static centralities: between-ness centrality, eigen-centrality, Page-rank, and degree centrality. For
the comparison, we ranked channels according to a channel-weighted sum of the centrality in question (to account for possible
negative effects of a channel on an individual), and allocated our budget to the highest-ranked channels at the maximum possible
static rate until the exhaustion of our budget (r = 52). Table I summarizes the relative differences in outcomes between the
optimal dynamic budget allocation policy and the static benchmarks. We see that using our optimal water-filling algorithm
based on our novel cost-effectiveness metric leads to a 26% increase in the expected number of votes compared to the best
static policy based on common centrality measures, a significant improvement.
Note that due to our results outlined in Section IV-C, the total budget does not affect the relative priority assigned to the
channels by either the optimal algorithm (as it does not change the cost-effectiveness of channels) or the heuristics. Rather, it
16The mapping for bik within channel k was as follows: “Extremely conservative”:−1, “ Conservative”:−0.66, “Slightly conservative”:−0.33, “Moderate
middle of the road”: 0, “Slightly liberal”:0.33, “Liberal”:0.66, “Extremely liberal”:1.
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Fig. 9. We demonstrate a case with two hi(t)/vi functions for the case of linear ci(·). Areas above the water-line (βˆ(T )) translate to ui(t, βˆ(T )) = umaxi (t),
while those below translate to ui(t, βˆ(T )) = 0. The amount of budget spent for this βˆ(T ) can thus be calculated from the resulting ui(t, βˆ(T )), and so
βˆ(T ) can be adjusted to find β∗(T ).
determines how many of the channels with high priorities can be used without going over the budget. The results presented
in Table I are representative in the regime where the budget is a binding constraint in the choice of advertising channels.
VI. EXTENSION TO ASYMMETRIC INTERACTION WEIGHT MATRICES A
We assumed, in §III-B that the interaction matrix A was symmetric, i.e., aij = aji for all pairs i, j ∈ [n]. However,
asymmetric interactions can also be considered in our framework. We consider the weighted digraph G = (V,E,A), where
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Basis of decision-making Expected number of votes
Optimal Allocation 39.03
Betweenness centrality 29.86
Eigen-centrality 29.16
Page-rank 29.89
Degree centrality 30.03
TABLE I
EXPECTED NUMBER OF VOTES GAINED BASED ON THE GREEDY ALLOCATION OF BUDGET TO THE HIGHEST-RANKED CHANNELS ACCORDING TO
DIFFERENT TYPES OF CENTRALITIES.
(i, j) ∈ E represents a link from j to i (i.e., the associated weight aij is the weight agent i assigns to the opinion of agent j
in its opinion update).
We first need a definition akin to our assumption of connectedness for the undirected graph:
Definition 2. A quasi-strongly connected (QSC) digraph is a digraph that contains a rooted out-branching (i.e., a directed
spanning tree) as a sub-graph [53, p. 51, Definition 3.7], [27, Definition 6]
We know, from Gershgorin’s Disc Theorem [47, p. 357, Theorem 7.2.1], that the eigenvalues of an asymmetric Laplacian
matrix L will have non-negative real parts. Note also that due to the row-sums being equal to zero, the smallest eigenvalue of
L is always zero, its multiplicity is at least one , and one of its associated eigenvectors is 1√
n
1n. For quasi-strongly connected
digraphs we know that this eigenvalue is simple [53, p. 51, Proposition 3.8], [27, Lemma 8].
As mentioned in Remark 1, Lemma 1 and Theorem 1.1 carry over, with the number of switches being bounded above by
n− 1, when the interaction matrix is asymmetric, under the conditions that:
1) the digraph G is quasi-strongly connected (QSC).
2) all the eigenvalues of the asymmetric Laplacian L are strictly real;
3) ci(·) is linear.
Furthermore, the arguments around water-filling presented in §IV-C also follow, with a different definition of the function hi(t)
for all i ∈ [m].
Remark 6. Note that every weighted Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) has a Laplacian with real eigenvalues.
Proof. Every DAG G = (V,E) has a topological ordering, in which its vertices are ordered such that for all (u, v) ∈ E, u
appears before v in the topological order. [54, p. 151] Given this ordering, the asymmetric Laplacian L will be upper-triangular,
and thus the elements of its diagonal, which are real, will be its eigenvalues.
Here, we document the changes in the proof process for the case of asymmetric interactions.
A. Changes to §IV-A
We assume that the underlying digraph G is quasi-strongly connected (QSC). We now also consider the case where
the geometric multiplicities of the eigenvalues may be less than their algebraic multiplicities. By our assumption, all these
eigenvalues are real, and thus so are the associated simple and generalized eigenvectors.17 Furthermore, the set of (generalized)
eigenvectors can be chosen to be linearly independent, creating a canonical basis for Rn. Also let Q be a matrix whose columns
are these generalized eigenvectors of L, with the generalized eigenvectors corresponding to smaller eigenvalues appearing first,
those corresponding to the same eigenvalue and generated from the same Jordan chain appearing one after the other in order
of the chain (starting with the simple eigenvector), and chains corresponding to the same eigenvalue being ordered according
to the size of the chain (largest first). Then, we will have L = QΞQ−1, where now Ξ is the upper-triangular Jordan normal
form of L, with real, non-negative eigenvalues on the diagonal, with the eigenvalues appearing from the smallest to the largest.
Let µ ≤ n be the total number of Jordan blocks in Ξ; let Ξi be the i−th Jordan block, with size |Ξi| and corresponding to
eigenvalue ξi, for i ∈ [ν]. Note that
∑ν
i=1 |Ξi| = n; we also set |X0| = 0. While not all ξi may be distinct, yet we have
ξi ≤ ξi+1 for i ∈ [ν − 1] according to our construction. Note also that Q(:, 1) = 1√n1n for the simple 0 eigenvalue.
B. Changes to Lemma 1
The statement and proof of Lemma 1 do not change for this case.
C. Changes to the proof of Theorem 1
Nothing changes until the arguments around the zeros of 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 = constant in §Appendix B.
Now, we define y(t) := Q−1λ∗(t), and we will again have:
y˙ = Ξy.
17This is because the generalized eigenvectors associated with eigenvalue ξi create a basis for the null-space of (L− ξiI) in Rn.
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However, now due to the Jordan normal form structure of Ξ, the solution of the ODE will change; for all i ∈ [n] and
k ∈ [ν] uniondbl {0} such that ∑kj=0 |Ξj | < i ≤∑k+1j=0 |Ξj |, first let `i := i−∑kj=0 |Ξj | and ki = k. Then, we will have:
yi(t) =
( `i∑
j=0
tj
j!
yi−j(T )
)
eξki (t−T ) =
`i∑
j=0
tj
j!
〈
Q−1(i− j, :),λ∗(T )〉e−ξki (T−t).
Therefore:
λ∗(t) = Qy = Q
[ `i∑
j=0
tj
j!
〈
Q−1(i− j, :),λ∗(T )〉e−ξki (T−t)]
i
=
n∑
i=1
[ `i∑
j=0
tj
j!
〈
Q−1(i− j, :),λ∗(T )〉e−ξki (T−t)]Q(:, i).
And:
〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 =
n∑
j=1
[ `j∑
%=0
t%
%!
〈
Q−1(j − %, :),λ∗(T )〉e−ξkj (T−t)][〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉]
=
n∑
j=1
[
〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉
`j∑
%=0
t%
%!
〈
Q−1(j − %, :),λ∗(T )〉]e−ξkj (T−t) = s. (19)
Given that the smallest eigenvalue (0) is simple and associated with eigenvector 1√
n
1n, this is equivalent to:
n∑
j=2
[
〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉
`j∑
%=0
t%
%!
〈
Q−1(j − %, :),λ∗(T )〉]e−ξkj (T−t) + ([ n∑
h=1
bhi
〈
Q−1(1, :),λ∗(T )
〉]− s) = 0. (20)
To find the zeros of (20), we again reason based on whether any of the coefficients of the exponentials in (20) are non-zero
or not.
I) In the case where for some 2 ≤ ι ≤ ν,∑
j∈Ξι
[
〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉
`j∑
%=0
t%
%!
〈
Q−1(j − %, :),λ∗(T )〉] 6= 0,
we appeal to a generalized form of Lemma 4 to complete the proof that (20) has at most n− 1 roots:
Lemma 2. For K > 1 and M ≤ K, let η1 > η2 > · · · > ηM > 0. Also, for i = 1, · · · ,M, and j = 1, · · · , wi such
that
∑M
i=1 wi = K, let di,j be a real number. Then, if in the function f : R → R, f(t) =
∑M
i=1
∑wi−1
j=0 di,jt
jηti , we have
di,wi−1 6= 0 for all i, f(t) has at most K − 1 zeros.
The proof of this lemma is provided in §Appendix E. Therefore, the number of roots of (20) is bounded above by the number
of non-zero elements in
{∑
j∈Ξι〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉
∑`j
%=0
t%
%!
〈
Q−1(j − %, :),λ∗(T )〉}ν
ι=2
, which is itself bounded above by n−1.
II) This again leaves the case where for all 2 ≤ ι ≤ ν,
∑
j∈Ξι
[
〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉
`j∑
%=0
t%
%!
〈
Q−1(j − %, :),λ∗(T )〉] 6= 0.
II-1) If
∑n
h=1 bhi
〈
Q−1(1, :),λ∗(T )
〉 6= s, then (20) has no root and the claim holds.
II-2) Else the rest of the proof is the same as in §Appendix C, part II-2, for the linear ci(·) case.
D. Changes to §IV-C
Naturally, from the arguments above, Proposition 1 and the arguments around the water-filling approach carry over for the
case of linear ci(·) and separable linear J(·), under the condition that (10) is replaced with:
hi(t) =
n∑
j=1
[
〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉
`j∑
%=0
t%
%!
〈
Q−1(j − %, :),p(T )〉]e−ξkj (T−t) (21)
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VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We consider the problem of optimally allocating a finite budget over time across several advertising channels. We showed,
using Pontryagin’s maximum principle, that the optimal allocation follows a bang-bang structure, in which we either invest
fully in a channel or not at all. In other words, to maximize the effectiveness of our budget, we should invest fully over a
number of waves, and let the effect of the waves propagate in between waves. Furthermore, we show that the number of
advertising waves during which we invest fully is, in practice, much smaller than the number of agents in the network. This
result greatly facilitates the explicit computation of the optimal allocation policy over time. Furthermore, we showed that the
exact optimal control can be calculated using an efficient water-filling procedure for a linear objective. From this water-filling
procedure, we rigorously defined “cost-effectiveness” as a metric for ranking and comparing the influence of different channels
at differing times on outcomes. Finally, applying our results to the sigmoid approximation of the electoral campaign/voting
model model confirmed the intuitive notion that identifying last-deciders determines the campaign strategy.
These results can be generalized in various ways. The notion of channel interaction in this work did not come with any
constraints on the presence or attention of the channel members. Adding such a constraint can more clearly model real-world
interactions. Furthermore, the linear model of influence is also a constraint that may be relaxed to obtain more general structures
on influence control. Finally, this work looked at a single issue where each agents opinion was represented with a scalar - the
same methodology can be extended to find optimal advertising strategies with vectors of opinions.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. The solutions to the dynamics ODEs (1) and (7) exist for all u ∈ U as the RHS terms are locally Lipschitz. We also
have that for every (t,x(t), γ(t), q(t)), the set:
P :=
{(
(−Lx(t)+Bu(t) + e(t))T ,−
m∑
k=1
ck(uk(t)), 1
)∣∣∣∣um∗1(t) : 0 ≤ uk(t) ≤ umaxk (t), k ∈ [m]}
is compact, as the domain is compact and the functions are continuous. P is also convex, as in the first n dimensions, it
is mapped linearly from a convex set, in the n + 1-th dimension it is also a linear mapping from a convex set (for linear
ci(·)), and it is constant in the n + 2-th dimension. Thus, according to Filippov’s theorem [36, page 119], the reachable set
RT (x0, 0) := {(x(T ), γ(T ), q(T )) : x(0) = x0, γ(0) = 0, q(0) = 0, u ∈ U} from (x0, 0, 0) is compact and convex. The
reachable set will still be compact and convex if we restrict it by only looking at controls that lead to γ(T ) ≥ −r (as it is
an intersection of two convex sets).18 By the Weierstrass theorem [36, page 7], the continuous function J(x(T )) will have a
global maximum on this compact set. Thus, by the definition of the reachable set, there exists a control that steers the state to
this global maximum, and all such controls will thus be optimal.
18This set is non-empty because u(t) = 0 for all t is a member.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We define co-state variables corresponding to each of the state variables in (9), as summarized in Table II. For this new
state variable x γ q
co-state variable λ β z
TABLE II
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE STATE VARIABLES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE CO-STATE VARIABLES.
system of equations, we define the Hamiltonian as:
H(x(t), γ,λ, β,u(t), t) = −λTLx + λTBu + λTe(q)− β
m∑
k=1
ck(uk)+z, (22)
where for the continuous co-state functions we have (at points of continuity of the controls):
λ˙(t) = −dH
dx
= LTλ(t), β˙(t) = −dH
dγ
= 0, (23)
z˙(t) = −dH
dq
= −
〈
de(q)
dq
,λ
〉
, (24)
with terminal state constraints:
λ(T ) =
λ0∂J(x(T ))
∂x(T )
≥ 0, z(T ) = λ0∂J(x(T ))
∂z(T )
= 0, (25)
β(T ) ≥ 0, β(T )[γ(T ) + r] = 0, (26)
with λ0 ∈ {0, 1}.
For the case of the sigmoid cost function in (6), this means
λi(T ) =
λ0αe
−α(xi(T )−θi)(
1 + e−αi(xi(T )−θi)
)2 , (27)
while for the linear cost function (5), we will have:
λi(T ) = λ0pi. (28)
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (PMP) [37, page 182] gives us the following necessary conditions for an optimal control
19:
If:
• u∗ ∈ U is the piecewise continuous optimal control,
• x∗, γ∗, q∗ are state trajectories to (9) under the optimal control,
• λ∗, β∗, z∗ are continuous co-state real-valued functions on [0, T ] that satisfy the terminal time constraints (25) and (26),
and dynamics (23) and (24) at points of continuity of the controls,
then for any control u ∈ U that respects (2), the following holds:
1) For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T :
H(x∗(t), γ∗,λ∗, β∗, z∗,u∗(t)) ≥ H(x∗(t), γ∗,λ∗, β∗, z∗,u(t)), (29)
2) (λ0,λ∗(t), β∗(t), z∗(t)) 6= 0n+3 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Since β˙∗(t) = 0 by (23) for all times at which the controls are continuous, and also due to continuity of the co-states, we
obtain:
β∗(t) = β∗(T ), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. (30)
For i ∈ [m], we will use ϕi(t) to denote the part of the Hamiltonian (22) that depends explicitly on ui. Therefore for all
i ∈ [m] (using (30)):
ϕi(ui, t) := 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉ui − β∗(T )ci(ui). (31)
The point-wise Hamiltonian maximizing condition (29) of the PMP leads to the fact that ϕi(u∗i , t) ≥ ϕi(ui, t) for all t and
all ui ∈ [0, umaxi (t)]. Due to the differentiability of the co-states, ϕi(·) is a convex function of the bounded ui(t), and thus it
19These necessary conditions are stated for an autonomous system, as the dynamics and thus (22) do not depend explicitly on time.
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will be maximized either at one of the upper- or lower-bounds of ui(t), or it will have the same value for all ui ∈ [0, umaxi (t)].
This is because due to the convexity:
ϕi(ui, t) = ϕi
(
(1− ui
umaxi (t)
) ∗ 0 + ui
umaxi (t)
∗ umaxi (t), t
) ≤ (1− ui
umaxi (t)
) ∗ ϕi(0, t) + ( ui
umaxi (t)
) ∗ ϕi(umaxi (t), t))
≤ (1− ui
umaxi (t)
+
ui
umaxi (t)
) ∗max{ϕi(0, t), ϕi(umaxi (t), t))} = max{ϕi(0, t), ϕi(umaxi (t), t))}.
We will now present different arguments for how the Hamiltonian maximizing condition is refined for strictly concave and
linear ck(·) functions. The arguments in each case only depend on the nature of ck(·), and thus we also consider vector function
c(·) that simultaneously has elements that are linear and strictly concave:
1) For the case of strictly concave ci(·), Theorem 1 only considers cases where umaxi (t) = umaxi , i.e., is a constant. At
each time t, ϕi(ui(t), t) = 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉ui(t) − β∗(T )ci(ui(t)) is convex in ui(t). Therefore, it is maximized either
at its upper or lower-bound (i.e., u∗i (t) ∈ {0, umaxi }). Thus, it suffices to compare ϕi(0, t) = 0 and ϕi(umaxi , t) =
〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉umaxi − βci(umaxi ). Thus, the Hamiltonian maximizing condition (29) becomes20:
u∗i (t) =

umaxi , if 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 > β∗(T ) ci(u
max
i )
umaxi
,
0, if 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 < β∗(T ) ci(umaxi )umaxi ,
?, if 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 = β∗(T ) ci(umaxi )umaxi .
(32)
2) For the case of linear ci(ui) = viui, at each time t, ϕi(ui(t), t) =
(〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 − β∗(T )vi)ui. Thus, the Hamiltonian
maximizing condition (29) becomes:
u∗i (t) =

umaxi (t), if 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 > β∗(T )vi,
0, if 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 < β∗(T )vi,
?, if 〈λ∗(t),B(: .i)〉 = β∗(T )vi.
(33)
As can be seen, the right-hand side of the condition terms in both cases (i.e., β∗(T )ci(umaxi ) in (32) and β
∗(T )vi in
(33)) is a positive constant. Thus, the structure of the optimal control u∗i can be understood by examining the fluctuations of
〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 around two constant values (β∗(T ) ci(umaxi )umaxi and β
∗(T )vi).21
We can trivially show, using the second PMP necessary optimality condition, that the optimal control is normal [36, page
82] (i.e., λ0 6= 0):
Lemma 3. There is no case for which λ0 = 0.
Proof. If λ0 = 0, from (25), λ∗(T ) = 0. As λ∗(t) = 0n for all t is a solution of the differential equation λ˙∗(t) = LTλ∗(t)
with this condition, due to the uniqueness of solutions to differential equations [37, Theorem A.8] it is also the unique solution.
Now, as (25), the only way for
(λ0,λ
∗(T ), β∗(T ), z∗(T )) 6= 0n+3
(which is the second necessary condition of the PMP) to hold is for β∗(t) = β∗(T ) 6= 0, which together with (26) leads to
β∗(T ) > 0. In this case, for all i, and for all t,
ϕi(ui, t) = 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉ui − β∗(T )ci(ui) = −β∗(T )ci(ui)
and therefore due to the Hamiltonian maximizing condition (29), u∗i (t) = 0 for all such i and all t. This leads to γ˙∗(t) = 0 for
all t, and thus γ∗(T ) = 0. Therefore β∗(T )[γ∗(T ) + r] = β∗(T )r > 0, which is a contradiction with (26). Therefore λ0 = 0
leads to (λ0,λ∗(T ), β∗(T ), z∗(T )) = 0n+3, a contradiction with PMP.
Thus, henceforth we replace λ0 with 1, and have from (25) and Assumption 3 that there exists a j ∈ [m] such that:
λ∗j (T ) > 0. (34)
Zeros of 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 = constant:
In this subsection, we look at the dynamics of the function 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉, especially with regards to how many times it
can fluctuate around a fixed value in the time-horizon. Any time that this function crosses the fixed value, due to (32) and (33),
it leads to a switch in the optimal control from one bound to another, and if it is equal to the fixed value over any interval,
then the PMP cannot uniquely determine the optimal control (i.e., the optimal control is singular [36, page 113]).
Henceforth, let s ≥ 0 denote the positive constant that 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 is set equal to. We claim that the expression for
〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 = s, as a function of time t, at most has n− 1 roots. Therefore due to the continuity of each of the elements
20The question mark denoting the fact that PMP does not uniquely determine the optimal u∗i at times t when ϕi(t, ui) does not change with ui.
21Notice that according to the system model, ci(·)’s can potentially be a mix of linear and strictly concave, and the above statement for any concave or
linear ci(·) is independent of the nature of all other cj(·)’s (even if they are not concave at all). For more details, see Remark 3.
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of λ∗, we have that u∗i (t) is either equal to u
max
i (t), or 0 for all t except maybe at n− 1 points where it can switch between
those two values, proving both parts (1) and (2a) of the theorem. We now prove this claim:
We know that λ˙∗ = LTλ∗. So we have:
λ˙∗ = QΞTQTλ∗ = QΞQTλ∗,
as Ξ is a diagonal matrix.
We define y(t) := QTλ∗(t). As the columns of Q are orthogonal, therefore
y˙ = QT λ˙∗ = (QTQ)ΞQTλ∗ = ΞQTλ∗ = Ξy,
with y(T ) = QTλ∗(T ). Therefore, due to the uniqueness of solutions to ODEs [37, Theorem A.8], for all i ∈ [n]:
yi(t) = yi(T )e
ξi(t−T ) = 〈Q(:, i),λ∗(T )〉e−ξi(T−t).
Again using the fact that Q is unitary, we have:
λ∗(t) = (QQT )λ∗(t) = Qy = Q
[
〈Q(:, i),λ∗(T )〉e−ξi(T−t)
]
i
=
n∑
i=1
[
〈Q(:, i),λ∗(T )〉e−ξi(T−t)
]
Q(:, i).
So, we will have:
〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 =
n∑
j=1
[
〈Q(:, j),λ∗(T )〉e−ξj(T−t)
][
〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉
]
=
n∑
j=1
[
〈Q(:, j),λ∗(T )〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉
]
e−ξj(T−t)
= s. (35)
As {Q(:, i)}i is an eigenvector decomposition of L and therefore ξ1 = 0 and Q(:, 1) = 1√
n
1n, (35) becomes:
n∑
j=2
[
〈Q(:, j),λ∗(T )〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉
]
e−ξj(T−t) +
( 1
n
n∑
k=1
λ∗k(T )
n∑
h=1
bhi − s
)
= 0. (36)
We now determine the number of roots of (36). We present separate arguments depending on whether any of the coefficients
of the exponentials in (36) are non-zero or not.
I) In the case where for some j > 1, [〈Q(:, j),λ∗(T )〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉] 6= 0,
the following lemma provides the last step in the proof of our claim.
Lemma 4. For K > 1, let η1 > η2 > · · · > ηK > 0. Also, for i = 1, · · · ,K, let di be a real, non-zero number. Then, the
function f : R→ R, f(t) = ∑Ki=1 diηti has at most K − 1 zeros.
Setting ηi = eξi for all i, d1 = 1n
∑n
k=1 λ
∗
k(T )
∑n
h=1 bhi− s and dj = [〈Q(:, j),λ∗(T )〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉]e−ξjT for j > 1 in
this lemma proves that (36) has at most n−1 roots. The proof of this lemma is provided in §Appendix C. Therefore, the number
of roots of (36) in this case is bounded above by the number of non-zero elements in
{〈Q(:, j),λ∗(T )〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉}n
j=2
,
which is itself bounded above by the number of non-zeros in
{〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉}n
j=2
. This is significant because while λ∗(T )
is not known without the state dynamics (it is a function of the unknown x∗(T ), and thus implicitly depends on the trajectory),
this bound applies to all possible state trajectories (i.e., for all x(0)). Thus the number of switches in this case is trivially
bounded by one less than the number of non-zero elements in {〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉}nj=1.
II) This leaves the case where for all 2 ≤ j ≤ n, [〈Q(:, j),λ∗(T )〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉] = 0. This means that 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 =
1
n (
∑n
k=1 λ
∗
k(T ))(
∑n
h=1 bhi), a constant, for all t. Now, in order to find the number of roots of (36), we consider the following
two cases:
II-1) If 1n (
∑n
j=1 λj(T ))(
∑n
h=1 bhi) 6= s, then (36) has no root and the claim holds.
II-2) Else we have 1n (
∑n
j=1 λj(T ))(
∑n
h=1 bhi) = s, meaning that (36) holds for all t. We show how this will not be the
case for any disciplined channel.
Since {Q(:, j)}nj=1 forms an orthonormal basis for Rn (due to the orthogonality of Q), this means that we can look at the
inner product in this basis:
n∑
j=1
λ∗j (T )bji = 〈λ∗(T ),B(:, i)〉 =
n∑
j=1
[〈Q(:, j),λ∗(T )〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉] = [〈Q(:, 1),λ∗(T )〉〈Q(:, 1),B(:, i)〉]
=
1
n
(
n∑
j=1
λ∗j (T ))(
n∑
k=1
bki) ⇒
n∑
j=1
λ∗j (T )
(
bji − 1
n
n∑
k=1
bki
)
= 0, (37)
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which defines a hyper-plane in the space of λ∗(T ). But from (36), we have that:( n∑
j=1
λ∗j (T )
)( 1
n
n∑
k=1
bki
)
= s, (38)
another hyper-plane. Equations (37) and (38) define the λ∗(T )-space over which
〈
λ∗(t),B(:, i)T
〉
= s for all t ∈ [0, T ], and
thus the Hamiltonian maximizing necessary condition (29) does not restrict u∗i over this interval. Such trajectories are known
as singular arcs [36, page 113].
We present different arguments depending on ci(·):
II-2-a) If ci(·) is strictly concave, then we utilize the generalized Legendre-Clebsch necessary condition of optimality on
singular arcs [55]: we must have
d2H
du2
 0. However, d
2H
du2i
= −β∗(T )c′′(u∗i ) ≥ 0, due to the strict concavity of ci(·). Thus,
we must have β∗(T ) = 0. So (38) becomes:
(∑n
j=1 λ
∗
j (T )
)(
1
n
∑n
k=1 bki
)
= 0. This means that either
∑n
j=1 λ
∗
j (T ) = 0 (a
contradiction with (34)) or
∑n
k=1 bik = 0 (ruled out for disciplined channels, the ones considered by this theorem, by Definition
1). Thus we have a contradiction, meaning that this case will never arise.
II-2-b) If ci(·) is linear, we have: ϕi(ui(t), t) = (〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 − β∗(T )vi)ui. For the singular arc case, we must have
Φ(t) := 〈λ∗(t),B(:, i)〉 − β∗(T )vi = 0 over all t. Thus, as this function is maximally flat, all its derivatives with respect to
time must also be zero (infinite-order singularity). We must have:
dΦ(t)
dt
=
〈
λ˙∗(t),B(:, i)
〉
=
〈
LTλ∗(t),B(:, i)
〉
= λ∗T (t)LB(:, i) = 0.
Using an induction, we can see that for l ≥ 1:
dlΦ(t)
dtl
=
〈
(LT )lλ∗(t),B(:, i)
〉
= λ∗T (t)LlB(:, i) = 0.
So we must have: 〈
λ∗(t),
[
LB(:, i)| . . . |LnB(:, i)
]〉
= 0.
But we have λ∗j > 0 for some j (due to (34)), so λ
∗(T) 6= 0n. This, however, means that we must have rank(
[
LB(:
, i)| . . . |LnB(:, i)
]
) < n. However, since the system (L,LB(:, i)) is controllable, this matrix must have row rank n (due to
the necessary and sufficient condition of controllability of linear systems [48, Theorem 6.1]). This is a contradiction, meaning
that the singular case will not arise in this case either.
This concludes the proof of parts (1) and (2a) of the theorem. We now proceed to part (2b) of the theorem.
When J(x(T )) = 〈p,x(T )〉, from (28), we have λ∗(T) = p. Thus, we can refine the result stated in part (2a) using this
additional information into the result in (2b). We will, however, require differing, stronger arguments for argument I after (36)
to obtain the tighter bound on the number of switches (as all the cases in II are either trivial or are shown not to arise). Thus,
if we prove that:
n∑
j=2
[
〈Q(:, j),p〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉
]
e−ξj(T−t) +
( 1
n
n∑
k=1
pk
n∑
h=1
bhi − s
)
= 0, (39)
has at most {∑jk=1 sk}nj=1 zeros, where
sj := 〈Q(:, j),p〉〈Q(:, j),B(:, i)〉,
then we are done. This can be seen to be true due to the following generalization of Descartes’ rule of signs (due to [56,
Theorem 4.7]), as applied to (39), with di defined as in the application of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. The number of positive zeros of the exponential polynomial function f : R → R, f(t) = ∑ni=1 di(e−t)ξi is
upper-bounded by the number of variations in sign in the sequence {si}i, where si =
∑i
j=1 dj .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof. By induction on K.
I) K = 1: f(t) = d1ηt1, which does not have a root as d1 6= 0. Therefore the base case holds.
II) K = k → K = k + 1:
f(t) =
k+1∑
i=1
diη
t
i = η
t
k+1(dk+1 +
k∑
i=1
di(
ηi
ηk+1
)t) = ηtk+1g(t),
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with every zero of f(t) being a zero of g(t). Now:
g′(t) =
k∑
i=1
[
di ln(
ηi
ηk+1
)
]( ηi
ηk+1
)t
.
Notice that all these coefficients are non-zero due to the statement of the theorem. Thus, due to the induction hypothesis, g′(t)
has at most k − 1 zeros.
We complete the proof by appealing to Rolle’s theorem [57, p. 184, Theorem 4.4]:
Theorem 2 (Rolle’s theorem). If h(·) is a continuous-everywhere function on [a, b] and has a derivative at each point in (a, b)
and h(a) = h(b), then there exists c ∈ (a, b) such that h′(c) = 0.
If g(t) has strictly more than k zeros, then by the theorem, g′(t) will have strictly more than k − 1 zeros, a contradiction.
Thus, g(t), and thus f(t), can have at most k zeros, completing the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 5 CONDENSED FROM [56]
Proof. We first state and prove two lemmas:
Lemma 6. Suppose g(·) has a zero of order k at t = t0. Let h(·) be another function such that h(t0) 6= 0. Then g(·)h(·) has
a zero of order k at t = t0.
Proof. For all n, we have:
dn
dtn
(g(t)h(t)) =
n−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
dig(t)
dti
dn−ih(t)
dtn−i
+
dng(t)
dtn
h(t).
For n = 1, . . . , k both terms on the right-hand side are zero at t = t0 due to the order of the g(·) zero. However, for n = k+1,
while all the terms in the sum again be zero, as h(t0) 6= 0 and d
k+1g(t0)
dtk+1
6= 0, then
dk+1
dtnk + 1
(g(t)h(t)) 6= 0,
completing the proof of the lemma.
For every real function g(·), we define Z+(g) to be the number of zeros of g(·) over t ∈ (0,∞) (counted with their potential
multiplicities).
Lemma 7. Suppose ι(x) is bounded, continuous, and non-zero on each interval (xi−1, xi) such that −∞ < x1 < . . . < b = xn.
We will count xi as a sign change if the sign of ι(x) is different in (xi−1, xi) and (xi, xi+1). Then, if g(t) =
∫ b
−∞ ι(x)e
txdx
and m is the number of sign changes of ι(x) in the interval (−∞, b), Z+(g) ≤ m.
Proof. We prove Z+(g) ≤ m by induction on m:
m = 0: If ι(x) > 0 for all x < −ξ1, it will also be positive in all intervals (xi, xi+1). This means that g(t) > 0 for all such
t, and therefore Z+(g) = 0. The same reasoning applies to ι(x) < 0 over x < −ξ1.
We now assume the result for m = k and prove the m = k + 1 case. If the number of sign changes of ι(x) is k + 1,
without loss of generality we assume the last zero-crossing happens at xk. So ι(x) > 0 over x ∈ (xk−1, xk) and ι(x) < 0
over x ∈ (xk, xk+1). Define h(t) := e−xktg(t) =
∫ b
−∞ ι(x)e
t(x−xk)dx. From Lemma 6, Z+(h) = Z+(g).
We now look at k(t) :=
dh(t)
dt
(using the Leibniz integral rule to change the order of differentiation and integration):
k(t) =
∫ b
−∞
(x− xk)ι(x)et(x−xk)dx. (40)
The function I(x) = (x− xk)ι(x) fulfills the conditions of the lemma for the same set of {xi} points, with the exception that
it will not change signs at xk (as both terms in I(x) will change signs at that point). Thus, the total number of sign changes of
I(x) over (−∞, b) will be k, and by the induction step, Z+(k) ≤ k. Using the same Rolle’s theorem (Theorem 2) argument
in the proof of Lemma 4, we can see that thus Z+(h) ≤ k + 1, completing the proof of this lemma.
We now proceed with the proof of Lemma 5. Define S({si}i) to be the number of sign variations in {si}i. Note:
f(t) =
n∑
i=1
di(e
−t)ξi =
n−1∑
i=1
si
(
(e−t)ξi − (e−t)ξi+1)+ sn(e−t)ξn
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Furthermore, because de
tx
dt = xe
tx:
f(t) =
n−1∑
i=1
si
(
(e−t)ξi − (e−t)ξi+1)+ sn(e−t)ξn = n−1∑
i=1
si
∫ −ξi
−ξi+1
tetxdx+ sn
∫ −ξn
−∞
tetxdx
= t
( n−1∑
i=1
∫ −ξi
−ξi+1
sie
txdx+
∫ −ξn
−∞
sne
txdx
)
(41)
Define g(t) :=
∑n−1
i=1
∫ −ξi
−ξi+1 sie
txdx +
∫ −ξn
−∞ sne
txdx. Then by Lemma 6, Z+(f) = Z+(g). Define ι(x) := si for −ξi+1 <
x < −ξi and ι(x) := sn for x < −ξn.22 Then, from (41):
g(t) =
∫ −ξ1
−∞
ι(x)etxdx. (42)
But ι(x) fulfills the conditions of Lemma 7 with S({si})i number of points where its sign changes. Thus, by that lemma,
Z+(g) ≤ S({si})i, and therefore Z+(f) ≤ S({si})i, completing the proof of this lemma.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. By induction on M.
I) M = 1: f(t) =
∑w−1
j=0 djt
jηt = ηtg(t), with f(t) = 0 only if g(t) = 0. Due to the fundamental theorem of algebra, g(t)
has at most w − 1 = K − 1 real zeros (as dw−1 > 0), and therefore the base case holds.
II) M = k →M = k + 1:
f(t) =
k+1∑
i=1
wi−1∑
j=0
di,jt
jηti = η
t
k+1(
wk+1−1∑
j=0
dk+1,jt
j +
k∑
i=1
wi−1∑
j=0
di,jt
j(
ηi
ηk+1
)t) = ηtk+1g(t),
with every zero of f(t) being a zero of g(t). Now:
g′(t) =
wk+1−1∑
j=1
dk+1,jjt
j−1 +
k∑
i=1
wi−1∑
j=0
di,jjt
j−1(
ηi
ηk+1
)t +
k∑
i=1
wi−1∑
j=0
di,jt
j(
ηi
ηk+1
)t ln(
ηi
ηk+1
)
=
wk+1−2∑
j=0
dk+1,j+1(j + 1)t
j +
k∑
i=1
di,wi−1t
wi−1(
ηi
ηk+1
)t ln(
ηi
ηk+1
) +
k∑
i=1
wi−2∑
j=0
di,j+1t
j(
ηi
ηk+1
)t(j + 1 + ln(
ηi
ηk+1
)).
Differentiating wk+1−1 more times, the first term vanishes, and the other terms only change in their coefficients. Specifically,
the coefficient of the twk−1(
ηk
ηk+1
)t term will be dk,wk−1
(
ln(
ηi
ηk+1
)
)wk+1 , which is non-zero due to the statement of the
theorem. Thus, due to the induction hypothesis,
∂wk+1−1g(t)
∂twk+1−1
has at most
∑k
i=1 wi − 1 zeros.
We now complete the proof by repeatedly appealing to Rolle’s theorem [57, p. 184, Theorem 4.4]:
Theorem 3 (Rolle’s theorem). If h(·) is a continuous-everywhere function on [a, b] and has a derivative at each point in (a, b)
and h(a) = h(b), then there exists c ∈ (a, b) such that h′(c) = 0.
If
∂wk+1−2g(t)
∂twk+1−2
has strictly more than
∑k
i=1 wi zeros, then by the theorem,
∂wk+1−1g(t)
∂twk+1−1
will have strictly more than∑k
i=1 wi − 1 zeros, a contradiction. Thus,
∂wk+1−2g(t)
∂twk+1−2
will have at most
∑k
i=1 wi zeros. Applying the same reasoning
reasoning wk+1− 1 more times shows that g(t), and thus f(t), can have at most
∑k+1
i=1 wi− 1 zeros, completing the proof of
the theorem.
Soheil Eshghi (M’08) received his Ph.D. degree in Electrical and Systems Engineering from the University of Pennsylvania in 2015. He is currently a
postdoctoral associate at Yale Institute for Network Science (YINS) and the Department of Electrical Engineering at Yale University. His research interests
include mathematical models of influence in social systems, as well as applications of optimal control and game theory to social, biological, and electrical
networks.
22The value of ι(x) can be arbitrarily assigned to a bounded value at the overlap points.
27
Victor M. Preciado received the PhD degree in electrical engineering and computer science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is currently
an associate professor of electrical and systems engineering with the University of Pennsylvania. He is a member of the Networked & Social Systems
Engineering program, the Warren Center for Network & Data Sciences, and the Applied Math & Computational Science (AMCS) program. He is a recipient
of the 2017 National Science Foundation Faculty Early Career Development (CAREER) Award. His main research interests lie at the intersection of big
data and network science; in particular, in using innovative mathematical and computational approaches to capture the essence of complex, high-dimensional
dynamical systems. Relevant applications of this line of research can be found in the context of socio-technical networks, brain dynamical networks, healthcare
operations, biological systems, and critical technological infrastructure. He is a member of the IEEE.
Saswati Sarkar received ME from the Electrical Communication Engineering Department at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore in 1996 and PhD from
the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at the University of Maryland, College Park, in 2000. She joined the Electrical and Systems Engineering
Department at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia as an Assistant Professor in 2000 where she is currently a Professor. She received the Motorola
gold medal for the best masters student in the division of electrical sciences at the Indian Institute of Science and a National Science Foundation (NSF)
Faculty Early Career Development Award in 2003. She was an associate editor of IEEE Transaction on Wireless Communications from 2001 to 2006, and
is currently an associate editor of IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networks. Her research interests are in stochastic control, resource allocation, dynamic games
and economics of networks.
Santosh S. Venkatesh (M’86) received the Ph.D. degree in electrical engineering from the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, in 1986. He is a
Professor with the Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. His research interests are in probabilistic
models, random graphs, epidemiology, and network and information theory.
Qing Zhao (F’13) received the Ph.D. degree in Electrical Engineering from Cornell University in 2001. She is currently a Professor and Gordon Lankton
Sesquicentennial Faculty Fellow in the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. Prior to joining Cornell University
in 2015, she was a Professor at University of California, Davis. Her research interests include sequential decision theory and stochastic optimization, machine
learning, statistical inference, and algorithmic theory with applications in infrastructure and communication systems and social economic networks. She is a
Fellow of IEEE. She received the 2010 IEEE Signal Processing Magazine Best Paper Award and the 2000 Young Author Best Paper Award from the IEEE
Signal Processing Society. While on the faculty of UC Davis, she held the title of UC Davis Chancellor’s Fellow.
Raissa D’Souza received the Ph.D. degree in statistical physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA, USA, in 1999. She
is a Professor of Computer Science and of Mechanical Engineering at the University of California Davis, Davis, CA, USA, as well as an External Professor
at the Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM, USA. She is a Fellow of the American Physical Society, serves on the editorial board of numerous international
mathematics and physics journals, has organized key scientific meetings like NetSci 2014, was a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda
Council on Complex Systems, and is currently the President of the Network Science Society.
Ananthram Swami (F’08) is with the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) as the Army’s ST (Senior Research Scientist) for Network Science. He is
an ARL Fellow and Fellow of the IEEE. He has held positions with Unocal Corporation, the University of Southern California (USC), CS-3 and Malgudi
Systems. He was a Statistical Consultant to the California Lottery, developed a MATLAB-based toolbox for non-Gaussian signal processing, and has held
visiting faculty positions at INP, Toulouse, and Imperial College, London. He received the B.Tech. degree from IIT-Bombay, the M.S. degree from Rice
University, and the Ph.D. degree from USC, all in Electrical Engineering. His research interests are in the broad area of network science with applications in
composite tactical networks.
